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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the effects of central bank governor appointments on financial market expectations
of monetary policy. To measure these effects, we assemble a new dataset of appointment announcements
from 15 countries, and conduct an event study analysis on exchange rates, bond yields, and stock prices.
The analysis reveals a significant reaction of exchange rates and bond yields to unexpected appointments.
The reactions are not unidirectional, and thus do not suggest new governors suffer from a generic credibility
problem. Federal Reserve chairman appointments  stand out in terms of their unusually pronounced
effects on financial markets.
Kenneth N. Kuttner






Peterson Institute for International Economics
1750 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC  20036-1903
aposen@petersoninstitute.org1 Introduction
The appointment of a new central bank governor usually makes headlines in the ﬁnancial
press, and those reports often attribute to the appointment the subsequent movement in
the ﬁnancial markets.1 Ben S. Bernanke’s October 24, 2005 appointment to chair the US
Federal Reserve, for example, generated hundreds of press reports and nearly as many
analyses and commentaries speculating on his policy leanings.2 Stocks climbed sharply
immediately following the announcement, while bond prices fell.
That ﬁnancial markets should react to the appointment of a new governor is hardly
surprising. After all, central banks’ policies can have signiﬁcant macroeconomic effects,
and it is taken as given that the governor exerts a disproportionate inﬂuence over those
policies. This may have been especially true in the case of Alan Greenspan, to whom
extraordinary powers of foresight were sometimes attributed and who was increasingly
personally identiﬁed with US monetary policy over the course of his long tenure.3 And
decades earlier, a similar degree of prescience and personal inﬂuence was attributed to
Benjamin Strong, the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (then the locus
of US monetary policy decisionmaking), whose death in 1928 is thought by some to have
contributed to the onset of the Great Depression.4
Governor-speciﬁc attributes also play a central role in much of the theoretical literature
on monetary policy. The currently standard framework for modeling policymakers’ incen-
tives, which began with Kydland & Prescott (1977) and Barro & Gordon (1983), opened
the door to characterizing differences in central bank behavior in terms of the objective
function attributed to the central banker, as well as the institutional setting within which
1This paper uses the term “governor” generically to refer to the head of the central bank, even when the
actual job title is “president” or “chair.”
2Factiva alone reports 1322 such articles on the day of, and the day following, his appointment.
3This is nicely illustrated by Senator John McCain’s unforgettable quip from a 1999 GOP presidential
debate: “:::if Mr. Greenspan should happen to die, God forbid, I would do like they did in the movie
‘Weekend at Bernie’s,’ I would prop him up and put a pair of dark glasses on him and keep him as long as
we could.”
4Friedman & Schwartz (1963, p. 412-13) conjectured that “if [Benjamin] Strong had still been alive and
head of the New York [Federal Reserve] Bank in the fall of 1930, he would very likely have recognized the
oncoming liquidity crisis:::” and taken “appropriate measures to head it off.”
1he or she served. This was made explicit in the inﬂuential Rogoff (1985) model of the
“conservative” central banker. In a similar vein, the model of Cukierman & Meltzer (1986)
distinguishes between different central banker types—“hawks” versus “doves”. Financial
market commentary often makes much of this distinction in central bankers’ preferences
when forecasting appointees’ likely inﬂuence on monetary policy.5
The point of this paper is not to determine whether, and to what extent, central bank
governors inﬂuence monetary policy and the economy—we assume that they do. Rather,
it is to determine whether ﬁnancial markets perceive that the central bank appointments
contain new information relevant to policy expectations.6 If so, then these appointments (or
more precisely, the announcements) should move markets through their effects on expected
inﬂation and interest rates.
Our objective is therefore to assess empirically the perceived information content, if
any, of governor appointments in the eyes of ﬁnancial market participants. The paper’s
speciﬁc goals are threefold. The ﬁrst is to document the reaction of exchange rates, bond
yields, and stock prices, and to determine those reactions’ joint statistical signiﬁcance. The
second goal is to determine the extent to which the monetary policy framework in place
at the time of the appointment affects the magnitude of the market response. Third, we
are interested in whether the reactions indicate a generic concern about incoming gover-
nors’ anti-inﬂation credibility: if this were the case, we would expect to see a tendency for
announcements to be associated with rising bond yields and depreciating exchange rates.
So far as we know, this is the ﬁrst effort to analyze the impact of new governor appoint-
ments on ﬁnancial markets and monetary policy expectations. There is, of course, a large
literature on how economic news affects ﬁnancial markets, and a number of recent papers
5Bernasek(2005), forexample, wrotefollowingBernanke’sappointment: “Greenspandid, however, make
one thing clear [at the time of his appointment]: the need to combat inﬂation. He realized that he needed to
establish his credibility on this front. Soon after his appointment, the Fed raised interest rates by half a
percentage point and sent a message about his determination to tame price increases. He understood that an
unhappy bond market could undo a Fed chairman and that the economy would suffer the consequences:::.
The ﬁrst test will be [Bernanke’s] credibility on inﬂation ::: the vote that ultimately matters more will be the
one cast by the bond markets. Inﬂation will be their litmus test. Bond traders are already scouring Bernanke’s
record for evidence one way or the other:::. The bond market reacted by inching rates higher.”
6Note that the shifts in expectations created by these announcements need not be correct ex post.
2have examined the effects of speciﬁc monetary policy actions (i.e., changes in the target
federal funds rate for the United States) on ﬁnancial markets. Examples include Kuttner
(2001) for the bond market, Rigobon & Sack (2004) and Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) for
the stock market, and Faust et al. (2003) for the foreign exchange market. Others, such
as Lucca & Trebbi (2008), Bokus & Rosenberg (2006), and Reinhart & Sack (2005) focus
on the information content of Federal Open Market Committee minutes and other forms
of communication. Our study is in a spirit similar to that of G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005b),
who entertain the possibility that certain kinds of macroeconomic news can affect market
participants’ inferences about the central bank’s policy objectives. It is also closely related
to the case study of the 1987 Volcker-to-Greenspan transition in Meyer & Sack (2005).
Our approach is a systematic event-study analysis of 61 announcements of new gov-
ernor appointments and departures of incumbent governors. Our results are based on a
new dataset of central bank governor appointments spanning 15 countries and over three
decades; precise announcement dates, and the circumstances surrounding the appoint-
ments, were gleaned from contemporary press reports.
Our results reveal a pronounced and statistically signiﬁcant response of exchange rates
and to a lesser extent of bond yields and stock prices. Just as importantly, the responses do
not consistently point to an increase in inﬂation expectations. Some announcements appear
to create expectations of tighter monetary policy (i.e., higher real interest rates or a lower
inﬂation objective), while others are consistent with more expansionary policy. Overall,
the results suggest that appointments contain (or at least are thought to contain) new infor-
mation about future monetary policy. Moreover, the market appears to distinguish between
appointments we term “newsworthy” and appointments whose announcement contains no
new information regarding the new governor’s likely preferences. In addition, the market
responses are considerably more pronounced for central banks lacking independence or a
ﬁrm domestic nominal anchor than they are for banks possessing those two features.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the nature of the information that
might be contained in the announcement of a new governor and presents some descriptive
analysis of the dispersion in inﬂation outcomes across central bankers. Section 3 describes
3the construction of the announcement dataset and the selection of the sample. Section 4
lays out the statistical framework and presents the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 On the information content of appointments
This paper’s premise is that central bank governors’ preferences can—or at least, are per-
ceived to be able to—inﬂuence the conduct of monetary policy. To make that maintained
assumption more concrete, it is worth taking a moment to review the ways in which the
governor’s preferences could affect the conduct of monetary policy, and how changes in
those preferences would affect ﬁnancial markets.
2.1 Characterizing central bankers’ preferences
The standard way to characterize the central bank’s preferences is in terms of a quadratic







t )2] ; (1)
where p is the inﬂation rate, pT is the central bank’s desired or “target” inﬂation rate, y
is real output, and y is equilibrium or potential output. Future outcomes are discounted
by the factor d, and l parameterizes the relative weight assigned to output ﬂuctuations in
assessing welfare costs, vis-` a-vis deviations of p from pT.
In the context of such an objective function, there are two dimensions along which
central bankers might differ from one another. One is in the weight they attach to output
relative to inﬂation stabilization—that is, they may have different values for l. Much of the
literature on central bankers’ preferences has focused on this parameter, which is typically
interpreted as summarizing the monetary authority’s “conservatism,” as deﬁned in Rogoff
(1985). A more conservative central banker will have a smaller value of l, indicating a
greater willingness to forgo output stabilization for the sake of inﬂation stabilization. This
means that, faced with a higher-than-desired inﬂation rate, a “low-l” central banker will
4pursue a relatively restrictive policy (i.e., high real interest rates) in order to achieve a
rapid disinﬂation. Differences in l seem to be implicit in business press reporting, which
often speaks of an appointee as being “pro-growth, relative to inﬂation” (Stanton, 2005), or
“favoring faster interest rate reductions” as a means to restore full employment (Harverson
& Corrigan, 1993). And in the academic literature, several efforts have been made to
estimate the l values associated with chairs of the Federal Reserve, such as ¨ Ozlale (2003)
and Favero & Rovelli (2003).
Central bank governors may also differ in terms of their desired inﬂation rate, pT.
This possibility has not received much attention in the theoretical literature, for the simple
reason that, under the standard assumption of a vertical long-run Phillips curve, there are
no gains to choosing a higher pT.7 Consistent with this assumption, most central banks
have converged in recent years towards average inﬂation rates of roughly two percent. This
has not always been the case, however: Favero & Rovelli (2003) estimated that the Federal
Reserve’s post-Volcker implicit inﬂation objective is three percentage points lower than it
was in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005b) found long-run inﬂation
expectations (measured by the spread between nominal and inﬂation-indexed bonds) are
not well anchored in the United States, implying some uncertainty about the Fed’s ultimate
inﬂation objective.
More subtly, central bank governors may also differ with respect to their perceived
“credibility,” deﬁned as the extent to which they are trusted to follow through with their
announced policies. In the extreme case of Barro & Gordon (1983), the absence of credi-
bility (along with a preference for higher-than-equilibrium output) can lead central banks to
choose higher inﬂation rates, in a futile effort to boost output.8 To the extent that it creates
an upward inﬂation bias, therefore, the lack of credibility has observable implications that
are similar to a higher pT.
7There may be practical reasons for choosing pT > 0, such as to compensate for the upward bias in
measured inﬂation rates or to create a buffer zone in order to avoid the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate and the possibility of outright deﬂation.
8This should be seen not as a literal mistake or willful ignorance by central bank governors, but as a proxy
for political and other pressures to expand output in an unsustainable way or for the lack of will to follow
through with a difﬁcult period of disinﬂation.
5In some models, the lack of credibility is a generic problem facing newly-appointed
central bank governors. In Schaumburg & Tambalotti (2003) and Kara (2007), for example,
the incumbent central bank governor can commit to policy during his or her own adminis-
tration, but the commitment is not binding on his successor, who may have an incentive to
exercise discretion immediately on taking ofﬁce. Interestingly, based on the increase in the
degree of inertia in the Fed’s policy rule, Kara (2007) concluded that credibility increased
under Volcker and Greenspan.
A similar, and more directly relevant, phenomenon arises in models in which the mar-
ket participants are uncertain about the underlying preferences of the incoming governor,
as in Cukierman & Meltzer (1986). In their model, a less conservative (“weak”) governor
initially has an incentive to mimic the behavior of a more conservative (“strong”) policy-
maker, at least until some point at which it becomes optimal to behave opportunistically,
thus revealing his true colors. Uncertainty about a governor’s type is therefore likely to
be highest at the start of a governor’s tenure, before he or she has had an opportunity to
demonstrate his anti-inﬂation credentials. In this “weak until proven strong” view, markets
may have a tendency to react adversely (i.e., with an increase in inﬂation expectations) to
the announcement of a new central bank governor, thus creating an “inﬂation scare” ` a la
Goodfriend (1993).
2.2 Some indirect evidence on differences in desired inﬂation
In line with the attention focused on new governor appointments, we ﬁnd it inherently
plausible that governors’ preferences can affect the conduct of monetary policy. And in-
deed, numerous studies have attempted to estimate governor-speciﬁc values of pT and l
for individual countries. Instead, we offer a bit of circumstantial evidence that historically,
there has been a considerable amount of dispersion in central bankers’ implicit inﬂation
objectives.
Our method is simply to calculate the inﬂation outcomes under each of the central
bank governors in our sample and regress these inﬂation rates on a time trend and country-
6speciﬁc dummy variables. Country dummies are included to account for the observed
tendency of certain countries to tolerate higher rates of inﬂation than others: Italy versus
Germany, for example. The time trend is included to account for the tendency of inﬂa-
tion rates to decline for virtually all of the countries in our sample, which begins in the
mid-1970s. Since it is reasonable to assume that the central bank achieves its inﬂation ob-
jective over a horizon of one to three years, the regression residual can be interpreted as a
rough gauge of (and surely an upper bound on) the size of the unobserved governor-speciﬁc
inﬂation preferences.9
We use two regressions to characterize the dispersion in inﬂation outcomes, and both
yield similar results. The ﬁrst is linear in all the variables, with a quadratic time trend,





to allow for a change in the rate of inﬂation reduction. The dj are country dummies, and
the intercept p77 captures the average inﬂation rate prevailing in 1977 (the ﬁrst year in the
sample). Note that because the country-speciﬁc effects are additive, a country dummy for
the 15th country (the United States) is omitted; consequently, the gj coefﬁcients represent
(time-invariant)inﬂationdifferentialsrelativetotheUnitedStatesThetimetermt isdeﬁned
as the midpoint of the central bank governor’s tenure.
The second regression builds in the observed tendency of inﬂation rates in the countries
in our sample to converge toward a rate of roughly two percent. This involves a nonlinear









In this model, the country-speciﬁc effects shrink as t increases, and eventually every coun-
try converges to an inﬂation rate of p0. The dj are again country-speciﬁc dummies, but
9This would not be true in cases of ﬁscal dominance, but this is not an issue in our sample of industrialized
countries.
7in this speciﬁcation they capture the inﬂation differential prevailing in 1977. (Because the
country-speciﬁc effects are not additive, a complete set of country dummies can be in-
cluded.) Estimates for both speciﬁcations appear in Table 1. The linear-in-variables model
is estimated both with and without the quadratic trend, and the nonlinear model is estimated
both with p0 freely estimated and with p0 set equal to 2.
We estimate equations 2 and 3 on a sample of 45 governors, over a period ranging
from 1977 through 2006.10 The parameter estimates are exactly what one would expect:
the coefﬁcient on the time trend is negative (implying lower inﬂation over time) and the
country effects capture plausible differences in average inﬂation across countries (positive
for countries such as Italy and Portugal, negative for Germany and Switzerland). Judging
from the ¯ R2, the nonlinear model with convergent inﬂation rates ﬁts much better than the
linear model.
From our standpoint, the most interesting message conveyed by the results is that the
regressions leave a great deal of inﬂation variance unexplained. In the nonlinear speciﬁ-
cation, for example, whose ¯ R2 is a respectable 0.784, the standard deviation of the error
term is 1.5. In other words, even controlling for the secular decline in inﬂation and the
tendency for inﬂation rates to differ systematically across countries, the standard devia-
tion of the error term remains an economically signiﬁcant 1.5 percentage points. Because
the governor-speciﬁc attributes are surely not the only unobserved random variables con-
tained in the error term, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the entire 1.5 percentage
points was due to governors’ preferences. Nonetheless, the results provide circumstantial
evidence for differences in inﬂation preferences across central bank governors.
Finally, it is worth noting that average inﬂation is not the only potentially measurable
outcome of differences in governors’ preferences. For example, different degrees of con-
servatism will, ceteris paribus, generate differences in the relative volatilities of output and
inﬂation. The problem is that these volatilities will also be affected by parameters other
10Since it is unrealistic to expect a central bank to reliably achieve its inﬂation objective over short periods
of time, governors with tenures of less than 12 months are excluded from the sample. We obtain similar
results when we limit the sample to governors serving three or more years.
8than l: the slope of the aggregate supply curve and the variances of the various shocks
affecting the economy. Estimating central bankers’ preferences from the second moments
would therefore require a structural approach like that of Favero & Rovelli (2003) or ¨ Ozlale
(2003).
2.3 Policy expectations and asset prices
Together, the theory sketched in section 2.1 and the descriptive results from section 2.2
suggest central bank appointments could shift ﬁnancial market expectations for future in-
ﬂation and real interest rates. Empirically discerning such an effect is complicated by the
lack of high-frequency direct expectations data, however. Surveys, such as those compiled
by Consensus Economics, are too infrequent to be of any use in this context. Market-
based measures derived from nominal and inﬂation-indexed bonds, such as those used by
G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005b) and Meyer & Sack (2005), are recent innovations and only avail-
able for a handful of countries. Lacking suitable expectations data, we rely on ﬁnancial
variables that are traded in deep and liquid markets, and are likely to be inﬂuenced by in-
ﬂation and interest rate expectations: exchange rates, bond yields, and (to a lesser extent)
stock prices.
The theory of uncovered interest rate parity, which relates the expected change in the
(log) nominal exchange rate, EtDet+1, to the spread between domestic and foreign interest
rates, it  i
t ,
EtDet+1 = it  i
t (4)
establishes a link between policy expectations and the exchange rate. Solving equation 4










where eT, the nominal exchange rate at some future date T, is interpreted as the long-run
equilibrium exchange rate, determined, for example, by the purchasing power parity (PPP)
9principle.
Expected changes in monetary policy can therefore affect the nominal exchange rate
either via the path of future interest rate differentials or through an effect on the perceived
equilibrium exchange rate. Expectations of a more restrictive monetary policy, which
would result from the appointment of a more conservative (smaller l) central banker in an
environment of higher-than-desired inﬂation, would tend to decrease e (appreciate) through
two channels: ﬁrst, by increasing i relative to i, and second, by reducing the expected fu-
ture price level via the PPP effect.
Announcements affecting the central bank’s perceived credibility (or alternatively, pT),
on the other hand, would tend to produce ambiguous exchange rate responses. While an
increase in inﬂation expectations would tend to increase i relative to i, reducing e, it would
at the same time raise the expected equilibrium eT via the PPP channel. Consequently, the
exchange rate is likely to be sensitive to perceived changes in the degree of conservatism
(l) attributed to the central bank.
For understanding the link between bond and policy expectations, the natural bench-
mark is the expectations hypothesis. The simplest version of the theory expresses the
long-term nominal bond yield iL as the average of expected future short-term (one-period)












inﬂation rate (or an increase in the inﬂation bias resulting from diminished credibility)
is clear, as an increase in expected inﬂation would tend unambiguously to raise nominal
interest rates and thus bond yields. The effect of an increase in central bank conservatism
(i.e., a smaller l) is somewhat less clear: while a tighter monetary policy will raise the
nominal short-term interest rates over some horizon, it will also reduce those rates over a
longer horizon, as inﬂation expectations decline. Nonetheless, as shown by Ellingsen &
S¨ oderstr¨ om (2001), the latter effect will dominate the former for bonds of a sufﬁciently
10long maturity, thus leading to a decline on long-term nominal interest rates. Bond yields
should therefore be highly sensitive to changes in the central bank’s perceived inﬂation
objective, but less so for changes in the perceived degree of conservatism.
Equity prices are even harder to interpret directly in terms of monetary policy expecta-
tions, eveninthecontextofthesimplestpossiblemodelinwhichtheequitypricerepresents
the discounted sum of future earnings. Monetary policy clearly can affect equity prices
through its effects on the discount rate applied to future earnings. What complicates in-
terpretation is that policy expectations are also likely to affect those future earnings—both
through the level of real economic activity and via its effects on inﬂation. Additionally,
the possible effects of monetary policy on risk premia, which Bernanke & Kuttner (2005)
found to account for a signiﬁcant share of the variance of equity returns, are not necessarily
consistent in sign with these other channels’ effect on equity prices, further complicating
the interpretation. Still, because higher inﬂation tends to be bad for stocks, examining the
stock market’s response to central bank appointments may contain useful information on
shifts in long-run inﬂation expectations.11
2.4 A null hypothesis and two alternatives
The discussion in section 2.1 suggests two economically interesting hypotheses regarding
the information content of central bank governor announcements. The ﬁrst is simply that
the appointments convey some sort of information relevant to the future conduct of mon-
etary policy. According to this view, market participants use whatever information they
have available to form an opinion of the new governor’s characteristics (l, pT, or “credi-
bility”). If these characteristics are thought to differ from those of the incumbent governor,
then the appointment will alter inﬂation and interest rate expectations. Then, through the
mechanisms discussed above in section 2.3, this shift in expectations will be reﬂected in
exchange rates, bond yields, and stock prices. Under this ﬁrst hypothesis, there is no pre-
sumption that the reaction will consistently tend in one direction or the other: the direction
11See Fama (1981) for some evidence on the link between inﬂation and stock returns.
11of movement will depend on the perceived governor-speciﬁc characteristics.
A second hypothesis is that credibility is a generic problem facing all new central bank
governors: that is, they are perceived to be weak (in the sense of being willing to tolerate
higher inﬂation) until they have had a chance to establish their strong anti-inﬂation cre-
dentials. As discussed above in section 2.1, this hypothesis is suggested by the models
of Cukierman & Meltzer (1986), Schaumburg & Tambalotti (2003) and Kara (2007) and
implies that changes in central bank governors will tend to be associated with at least a
transitory rise in inﬂation expectations. Thus, if this “weak until proven strong” hypothe-
sis is correct, then we should observe a tendency for new governors to be associated with
exchange rate depreciations and/or increases in bond yields.
The underlying null hypothesis in either case is that central bank appointments contain
no discernible information and thus generate no market reaction. There are several reasons
the appointment of a new central bank governor might be a non-event. One possibility is
that macroeconomic outcomes are determined primarily by luck (i.e., exogenous shocks)
or by policies outside of the central bank’s control, rendering the central bank, and its
governor, largely irrelevant. Another possibility is that ﬁnancial market participants lack
the information required to make meaningful inferences about the appointee’s preferences.
Alternatively, theremaybelittleperceivedvariationamongcentralbankers: ifallgovernors
were selected from a relatively homogeneous pool of candidates, then presumably any new
appointee would be expected to pursue policies similar to those of his predecessor.
We would also expect a muted ﬁnancial market response in cases where the ability of
governors to reset policy objectives is constrained by the institutional environment. When
the central bank is committed to a well-deﬁned nominal anchor, such as inﬂation target,
there will be little scope for an individual central bank governor to impose his or her pref-
erences on the policy process. (Conversely, it is unlikely that someone favoring, say, a 4%
rate of inﬂation would agree to serve as a governor of a central bank whose target was 2%.)
A slightly more subtle argument applies for central bank independence: by insulating it
from external pressure, independence allows a central bank to pursue its long-term policy
objectives without political interference. Superﬁcially, it might seem that a greater degree
12of independence would allow the central bank governor to exert greater discretion over
monetary policy. In the case of independence, however, the appointment of a new gover-
nor would be unlikely to signal a politically-motivated policy shift. Furthermore, Posen
(1995) argued that more independent central banks are associated with societies that are
more conservative in Rogoff’s (1985) sense (i.e., a smaller value of l in equation 1), and
this would also tend to reduce the information conveyed by new appointments. For these
reasons, central bank independence and a well-deﬁned nominal anchor, separately but es-
pecially in combination, should attenuate the ﬁnancial market’s reactions to new governor
appointments. We investigate this possibility below in section 4.4, splitting the sample
according to criteria reﬂecting central bank autonomy and the existence of an operational
domestic nominal anchor.
3 Data and sample selection
We used two criteria to determine the set of countries to be included and the time period to
be covered. First, we limit our analysis to industrialized countries. One reason to do so is
that a great deal of turnover among central bank governors in emerging markets is related
to—or in some cases, precipitated by—macroeconomic or ﬁnancial crises. This connec-
tion makes it hard to distinguish the impact of the appointment from the contemporaneous
ﬁnancial turmoil. In addition, because reliable English-language press reports from these
countries are scarce, it is often hard to pin down the precise announcement dates with any
certainty.
The second criterion used in selecting the sample is that the currency in question must
exhibit some degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility. Because a credible hard peg effectively
removes any scope for an independent monetary policy, central bank appointments in these
caseswouldcontainnoinformationonthelikelyfuturepathofinﬂationandinterestrates.12
Consistent with this criterion, the sample is limited to the post-Bretton Woods and (for euro
12For less than fully credible pegs, appointments could be seen as affecting the likelihood of exiting or
adjusting the parity. Such a “peso-problem” phenomenon would, presumably, be reﬂected in interest rates
and inﬂation expectations.
13adopters) the pre-euro periods.13 European countries maintaining a hard Deutsche mark
peg during the pre-euro period (e.g., Austria, Denmark, and Belgium) were also dropped
from the sample.14 The application of these two criteria yields a sample of 15 countries,
covering the years from 1974 through 2006 (through 1999 for those countries adopting the
euro).
The next step is to determine the dates of the governor appointments in the sample. It is
important to note that, because the analysis focuses on the ﬁnancial market impact, the rel-
evant dates are those for the announcements of a new central bank governor’s appointment
(or his predecessor’s departure), rather than the dates on which the new governor formally
took ofﬁce. Unfortunately, these announcement dates are not documented in any ofﬁcial
sources, requiring us to turn to published news sources available electronically through
LexisNexis, Factiva, and other online repositories. In the end, announcement dates for 50
central bank appointments were determined through this process.
3.1 Deﬁning and classifying events
There is considerable variation in the circumstances surrounding the 50 appointments in
the dataset, making for a fairly heterogeneous set of events. Some are orderly transitions to
a widely-anticipated successor, while others are more abrupt or involve the appointment of
a relative unknown. Because the information content of the announcements will depend to
some extent on these circumstances, it will be important to make distinctions among them
along two key dimensions.
13Although many of the countries in the sample were members of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM),
during most of the period the bands were of sufﬁcient width to allow for some degree of exchange rate
variation and monetary autonomy, as reﬂected in the measurable and persistent inﬂation differentials between
Exchange Rate Mechanism members outside of the hard-DM core. Matti Vanhala’s June 1998 appointment to
head the Bank of Finland was dropped, however, as the adoption of the euro was imminent, all but eliminating
any variability in the markka-DM exchange rate.
14When Klaus Liebscher left the presidency of the Austrian National Bank in 1998 to join the General
Council of the European Central Bank, the Financial Times quipped that he would have a “proper” job for
the ﬁrst time since he took over as head of the Bank in 1995, noting that “some unkind critics have joked
that his job could easily have been done by an incoming fax machine linked to the Bundesbank’s Frankfurt
headquarters” (Hall, 1998).
14One dimension has to do with whether the transition to the new governor was scheduled
or unscheduled. Scheduled transitions are those involving the expiration of a term or a
planned retirement; by contrast, unscheduled appointments would be those in which the
incumbent retired unexpectedly or was replaced. This is also a potentially useful distinction
because, in cases where there is a lag between the two, the incumbent’s departure and the
announcement of the successor can be treated as two separate events—at least for those
cases in which the date of the departure announcement can be determined. In addition to
the 50 new governor announcements, there are 12 such “unscheduled exit” announcements,
yielding a total of 62 distinct events.
In practice, distinguishing between scheduled and unscheduled transitions is usually
relatively straightforward: expirations of terms, planned retirements, and the like are gen-
erally matters of public record and thus easy to verify from press reports, central bank
sources, and Pringle (2007). Cases in which the incumbent was eligible for reappointment,
but did not receive it, are classiﬁed as unscheduled, on the grounds that the typical pattern
is to serve out an additional term, if allowed.15
The second key dimension is whether the identity of the new governor is known in ad-
vance of the ofﬁcial announcement. This critical distinction determines the extent to which
the announcement represents real “news,” as opposed to the ratiﬁcation of a fait accompli
already anticipated by the markets. The distinction is an especially important one for the
purposes of this paper, as efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets should, in theory, respond only to new
information. Considering this factor jointly with the scheduled/unscheduled distinction,
we can usefully partition the sample into two subsets: one consisting of 42 “newsworthy”
events, deﬁned as unscheduled departures and surprise new governor announcements, and
a second consisting of 20 “non-newsworthy” events encompassing appointments in which
the new appointee’s identity was widely anticipated.
Discerning the extent to which the new governor’s identity was known in advance is a
challenge, as there is no direct means to divine the market’s expectation of the next central
15Examples of events classiﬁed as unscheduled for this reason include the transitions from Arthur Burns
to William Miller in the United States, and from John Crow to Gordon Thiessen in Canada.
15bank governor.16 In the absence of market data, we rely on press accounts during the period
leading up to and including the announcement date. Often, the accounts are very clear
as to whether the appointment was as expected; in others, some judgment is required.17
Preventing sample selection bias naturally requires that this judgment be based exclusively
on external sources, such as contemporary press accounts—and not on the ﬁnancial market
reaction itself.
This method of classiﬁcation is admittedly somewhat subjective and based on limited
information—some errors are inevitable.18 Fortunately, the possibility of classiﬁcation
errors should not undermine the results: mis-classifying anticipated appointments as “sur-
prises” should tend to attenuate the measured response to announcements, biasing the re-
sults against ﬁnding a signiﬁcant reaction to central bank appointments. It is therefore
unlikely that any such random misclassiﬁcation would result in the spurious rejection of
the “no reaction” null hypothesis. It could, however, mask a distinct reaction to newswor-
thy versus non-newsworthy events, and as discussed below, this is the likely source of one
minor anomaly in our results.
Table 2 lists all 62 events, encompassing announcements of unscheduled departures
and new appointments. The table also indicates whether the identity of the appointee was
anticipated according to press reports.
16At least not until recently: in 2005, the betting site Intrade.com offered a futures contract allowing
investors to take positions on Greenspan’s successor. According to Intrade, Bernanke was the favored candi-
date, in the weeks leading up to the appointment, with a 40 percent probability of appointment; but Martin
Feldstein and Glenn Hubbard were also thought to be serious possibilities, with probabilities of 27 and 20
percent, respectively (Pethokoukis, 2005). This is consistent with the view of Meyer & Sack (2005) who,
writing at the end of August 2005, observed that “none of the candidates on the list has even emerged as a
clear favorite.”
17In the case of Mervyn King’s initial appointment to head the Bank of England, for example, the press
accounts suggest that, although King was the clear front-runner, Andrew Crockett was also a possibility. But
because King was so heavily favored, his appointment is coded as “known in advance.”
18In the absence of a large textual database, automated algorithms like those used by Lucca & Trebbi
(2008) and Bokus & Rosenberg (2006) are obviously not feasible.
163.2 Financial data
Having identiﬁed a set of events, as well as several interesting subsets, the next step is to
assemble high-frequency exchange rate, bond yield, and stock price data. The daily ex-
change rate data are taken from the Federal Reserve’s H.10 release. For the nine European
countries in the sample (other than Germany), the exchange rate is the bilateral rate relative
to the Deutsche mark. For Germany, and the other countries in the sample, the bilateral ex-
change rate with the United States is used; the US exchange rate is relative to the Deutsche
mark (the euro, post 1999).19
Daily bond yields are obtained from a variety of sources. Some are reported by the
central banks themselves, while others were collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Most are the yields on benchmark government securities, typically of a 10-year
maturity. The availability of high-frequency bond yield data is rather limited, however, as
liquid long-term bond markets are a relatively recent development in many countries in our
dataset. Consequently, bond yields are available for only 39 of the 62 events.
Daily values of the major equity market indexes in each country were obtained from
Haver Analytics and other sources. These high-frequency data are even more limited, how-
ever, and the stock price is available for only 33 of the 62 events. Further details on the
sources and availability of the ﬁnancial data used in the analysis appear in the appendix.
4 Measuring the market response to appointments
In gauging ﬁnancial markets’ response to central bank appointments, an important con-
sideration is that the news may move the markets in either direction, depending on the
nature of the information conveyed by the appointment. The unexpected appointment of
a governor with a preference for very low inﬂation, for example, would tend to strengthen
the exchange rate, while the appointment of one who was perceived to be soft on inﬂation
19It might seem at ﬁrst that using the Federal Reserve exchange rate data, which are collected at noon
Eastern time, would complicate the analysis—but the timing is such that announcements taking place during
normal business hours in both Europe and Asia would be reﬂected in the Fed’s data.
17would generate the opposite response. The challenge is to determine the extent to which
markets perceive that the incoming governor will bring with him or her a shift in policy,
while remaining agnostic on the direction of that shift. We therefore need a procedure for
detecting higher-than-normal volatility on announcement days.20
4.1 The statistical framework
A simple statistical speciﬁcation for modeling market reactions is as follows. On days
without appointment announcements the change in the ﬁnancial variable is modeled as a
random shock, e, embodying the impact of non-appointment related news on the ﬁnancial
markets. On appointment days, the ﬁnancial markets receive the usual shock e, plus a
second shock, h, incorporating the information content of the appointment. Speciﬁcally,





ei for i = 2 A
ei+hi for i 2 A
(7)
where zi is the suitably normalized change in the ﬁnancial variable, and A represents the set
of appointment days. The null hypothesis of interest is therefore that s2
h = 0. To the extent
that s2
h > 0, the variance of z would be higher on announcement days, and this would be
consistent with the hypothesis that announcements contain information of relevance to the
ﬁnancial markets.
The speciﬁcation readily encompasses the scenario in which only some subset of
the announcements is perceived to contain information. For whatever reason, some
appointments—even among those classiﬁed as newsworthy—probably convey little or no
new information. This could be the case for a variety of reasons: the new appointee’s
preferences might be perceived as similar to his or her predecessor’s, for example; or, the
announcement may have been misclassiﬁed or dated incorrectly. This can be captured with
a minor generalization of equation 7, in which only some fraction a of appointment days is
associated with the arrival of news in the form of an h shock; the remaining 1 a fraction
20Conventional event-study methods, such as those outlined in MacKinlay (1997), are designed to measure
excess returns around announcement dates, and so these techniques are not suitable for our application.
18would receive only the e shock. In this case, the variance of appointment days would still
be higher than that of other days, but the difference would be smaller to the extent that
a < 1.
One complication is that the variance of e may vary over time and across countries.
Testing for a higher variance on announcement days therefore requires normalizing the
change in each of the ﬁnancial variables so that a consistent threshold can be applied. The
natural way to do this is to de-mean each variable and divide by an estimate of its standard
deviation,
zi = (Dyi Dy)=ˆ s (8)
where Dyi is the change in the relevant ﬁnancial variable (the log of the exchange rate, the
bond yield, or the log of the stock price) from the day prior to the announcement. The av-
erage change in the variable, Dy, and the estimated standard deviation, ˆ s, are obtained from
a 90-day window ending two days prior to the announcement, which makes it a reasonable
estimate of se.21 Calculated in this manner, the z will have a mean of zero and unit variance
under the null hypothesis of s2
h = 0.
The measured ﬁnancial reactions (i.e., the zs and Dys) appear in table 2, along with the
appointment data discussed above. The zs are generally centered on zero and typically less
than one in absolute value. The sample nonetheless contains a number of relatively large
reactions with many exceeding two in absolute value. In the case of the exchange rate,
for example, 12 out of the 62 exceed this threshold. Casual inspection therefore suggests
something unusual tends to happen on announcement days.
There is one conspicuous standout on this dimension: the exchange rate reaction to
Finland’s appointment of Sirkka Hamalainen in 1992. Following a period of relative stabil-
ity, the 2.5 percent appreciation in the markka on April 3 (occurring immediately after an
equally sharp depreciation) represents a 13 standard deviation change. Because including
21In cases where the announcement was preceded by an unanticipated departure by the previous governor,
a 90-day window prior to the departure announcement is used. In two cases, there was not enough pre-
announcement bond yield data, and so a window beginning ten days following the announcement was used
for calculating ˆ s.
19this single extreme observation could easily skew the results, we drop it from the analysis
as an outlier, leaving 61 usable observations.22
4.2 Alternative statistical tests
We consider three methods to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of the difference between
the variance on announcement and non-announcement days. One to count the number of
unusually large realizations of z, where “large” is deﬁned as exceeding the critical value
associated with a given tail probability. If the zs are distributed normally, for example,
under the null hypothesis that s2
h = 0 (or a = 0), the expected value of the share exceeding
1.96 will be 0.05. The binomial distribution can be used to determine critical values for the
number of observations exceeding the threshold.




i will follow a c2
N distribution under the null hypothesis. A third procedure involves
calculating the average jzij and comparing this statistic to the relevant critical value. As-
suming the zi are distributed normally, the mean and variance of jzij would be those of the
truncated normal distribution. In addition, since zi has a zero mean and a unit variance un-
der the null, the hypothesis to be tested is that N 1å
N
i=1jzij = f(0)=F(0) = 0:798, where
f() is the normal density function and F() is the tail probability.
Theseproceduresareallbasedontheassumptionthatthezi arestatisticallyindependent
of one another. This condition is quite likely to hold in practice, as the events are separated
by both space and time; that is, there is no reason to believe that a change in the Finnish
exchange rate in May 1983, for example, would be correlated with a change in the Swiss
exchange rate in October 1984.
One important question regarding the alternative tests concerns their relative power
22As it happens, Hamalainen’s appointment followed the resignation of her predecessor, Rolf Kullberg, in a
public dispute over policy that sent a “shock wave through the Finnish money markets” and also resulted in a
spikeintheHeliborrateofnearlyfourpercentagepoints(Webb,1992). Withbyfarthelargestmarketreaction
in the sample, omitting this particular newsworthy event can only weaken the evidence for a signiﬁcant
aggregate ﬁnancial market response. Moreover, since the markka appreciated sharply, the omission of this
observation makes it more difﬁcult to dismiss the view that new governors are perceived as weak.
20against the null of s2
h = 0 (or a = 0). To address this question, we used monte-carlo
methods to calculate the three tests’ rejection probabilities for a values ranging from 0 to
1, assuming s2
h = 2s2
e. The sample size is 60, corresponding approximately to the number
of observations in our full sample of central bank appointments.23
The results, plotted in Figure 1, indicate that the c2 sum-of-squares test is the most
powerful of the three for most values of a, although the tail-based test is not far behind.
The power of the test based on the absolute value of z is considerably lower than that of
the other two, however. For a = 0:3, for example, the rejection probability is only 0.2,
compared with roughly 0.5 for the other two tests. In light of this ﬁnding, we used only the
c2 and tail-based tests in the results reported below.
Not surprisingly, even these tests’ power falls off markedly as the sample size shrinks.
As shown in Figure 2, the c2 test is able to reject the null reliably in large samples even
when a is relatively small: for a = 0:3, for example, the rejection rate is roughly 0.8 when
N = 200. The rate falls to 0.5 for N = 60, and for N = 20, the rate is only 0.25. The lack
of ﬁnancial data for many of the appointments in the sample will therefore limit our ability
to discern a signiﬁcant market impact.
A potential problem with the proposed statistical tests is that the theoretical critical
values are based on the assumption that the normalized changes in the ﬁnancial variables
(the z) obey a normal distribution. This may be a bad assumption for ﬁnancial data, which
often contain more large observations than one would expect in a normally-distributed
population.
To accountfor this possibility, we alsoreport tests basedon bootstrapped criticalvalues.
To obtain these values, we sampled with replacement zs from a population consisting of
the data from the 90-day window prior to the announcements, pooled across events. The
critical values of the sum-of-squares and tail-based tests correspond to the fractiles of the
23The calculations used 10,000 draws from a normal distribution, For the sum-of-squares and absolute-
value tests, the exact critical values were determined from the theoretical c2 and truncated normal distribu-
tions. Toavoiddiscontinuitiescreatedbythediscretenatureofthebinomialdistribution, anormaldistribution
was used for the tail-based test. In small samples, the normal approximation tends to overstate the power of
the tail-based test.
21empirical distribution of the test statistics, based on 10,000 replications. We repeated the
procedure for each of the three ﬁnancial variables and for all of the relevant sample sizes.
It turns out that in the case of exchange rates, the bootstrapped critical values are markedly
larger than those based on the c2 distribution: with N = 60, for example, the 5 percent
threshold is 91, versus 79 for the c2. For the tail-based test, the differences between the
bootstrapped and theoretical critical values are relatively small.
4.3 Responses distinguished by announcement type
The ﬁrst row of Table 3 contains our baseline results. In the case of exchange rates, we see
strong evidence of reaction in the full 61-event sample. The sum-of-squares test statistic
is 93.8, which is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level using the c2 critical values, and at the 5
percent level using the bootstrapped critical values.24 Eleven of the 61 events (18 percent)
areassociatedwithanexchangeratemovementinexcessof1.96standarddeviations, which
differs from the predicted 5 percent at the 1 percent level regardless of whether the binomial
or bootstrapped critical values are used.
The remaining rows of the table contain results in which the sample has been parti-
tioned according to the circumstances surrounding the appointment: resignations versus
new appointments, and whether the appointee’s identity was known in advance. We also
consider the set of “newsworthy” appointments, deﬁned as the set of unscheduled depar-
tures plus those appointments for which the new governor’s likely identity was not known
in advance.
Partitioning the sample in this way reveals a number of interesting patterns. First, we
ﬁnd a much stronger exchange rate reaction for 49 appointments than we do for the 12
unscheduled departures. The same is true when we compare the response to all newsworthy
events and to newsworthy appointments (i.e., dropping the unscheduled departures). In
these subsamples, the sum of squares statistics are signiﬁcant at the 1 or 5 percent level,
depending on whether the c2 or the bootstrapped critical values are used. Interestingly,
24Here, and in all the results reported below, the Hamalainen appointment is dropped.
22there is no signiﬁcant reaction when the sample is restricted to the 20 non-newsworthy
events (i.e., anticipated appointments), as would be expected according to the principle of
efﬁcient markets.25
The results in Table 3 also show a tendency for bond yields to react to central bank
appointments, at least in the case of new appointments. The relative paucity of usable
bond yield data somewhat diminishes the statistical signiﬁcance, however. Judging from
the sum-of-squares statistics, the reaction is signiﬁcant at either the 1 or 5 percent level
(again, depending on how the critical values are calculated) in the full sample and new
governor announcement subsamples; as with exchange rates, there is no signiﬁcant reaction
to unscheduled exits. Restricting the sample to the 20 newsworthy appointments also yields
a rejection of the null at the 10 percent level. With only three appointments associated with
a two-standard-deviation change in the bond yield (a share of 0.08 for the full sample and
0.09 for the new governor subset), the tail-based statistics are mostly insigniﬁcant.26
One puzzling result involving the bond yield is that it exhibits a signiﬁcant reaction
for the non-newsworthy subsample but not in the case of newsworthy events, contradict-
ing the efﬁcient markets principle. An inspection of the individual responses in Table 2
suggests that this anomalous response can be traced to two observations: Australia’s 1989
appointment of Bernie Fraser and Norway’s 1996 appointment of Kjell Storvik. Both of
these were classiﬁed as anticipated appointments, based on press reports, and yet, both
were associated with pronounced bond market responses. Yields rose 15 basis points (two
standard deviations) on Fraser’s announcement and fell 19 basis points (over four standard
deviations) on Storvik’s.
In Fraser’s case, the reason for the unusual reaction is clear. The likely choice of Fraser,
the sitting Secretary of the Treasury, had been criticized in the weeks prior to the announce-
ment as an appointment that would predispose the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to
25This is consistent with the ﬁnding in Kuttner (2001) that bond yields do not react to anticipated changes
in the federal funds rate target.
26The fact that two of the three unusually large reactions observed in the sample are quantitatively very
large (three and four standard deviations) explains the strength of the results based on the sum-of-squares
statistic, compared with those that use the tail-based test.
23yield to political pressure for more accommodative monetary policy.27 And, while Fraser
was widely viewed as the clear front-runner for the job, there was some speculation that
Bob Hawke’s government would back away from its preferred candidate and appoint in-
stead one of several viable candidates from within the RBA.28 Thus, the adverse market
reaction provoked by the announcement suggests Fraser’s appointment was not thought to
be entirely certain. Reclassifying Fraser’s appointment along these lines would render the
bond market’s reaction signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in the newsworthy subsample.
The pronounced reaction to Storvik’s appointment is more puzzling. Deputy governor
of the Norges Bank, Storvik was appointed acting governor after his predecessor, Torstein
Moland, resigned in 1995 to ﬁght tax evasion charges. With Storvik’s conﬁrmation for the
permanent position widely anticipated, it is unclear why the market would respond enthu-
siastically to his ofﬁcial appointment, unless it was a “relief rally” or a response to some
unrelated event occurring on the same day. Unfortunately, the English-language business
press contains no clues as to the cause of the bond market reaction.
Like the bond market, the stock market’s reaction to central bank appointments is some-
what weaker than it is for the foreign exchange markets. Again, with roughly half the ob-
servations of the exchange rate dataset, this is likely due to the low power of these tests
in small samples. Nonetheless, there is evidence of a signiﬁcant reaction in the case of
newsworthy appointments, which is exactly where one would expect to see the strongest
reaction. (The market’s 2.8 percent rally following Bernanke’s 2005 appointment is one
such example.) That there should be any signiﬁcant response in the equity market is a
little surprising given the small number of observations, and the less clear-cut theoretical
relationship between central bank preferences and equity values.
27Ironically, Fraser went on to establish inﬂation targeting at the Reserve Bank of Australia. This under-
scores the point made previously, that the ﬁnancial market’s reaction to an appointment need not correctly
anticipate the policy changes occurring under a new governor.
28See Walsh (1989) and Lloyd (1989).
244.4 The relevance of the monetary policy framework
We turn now to the question of whether the monetary policy framework affects the strength
of the markets’ response to new appointments. As discussed above in section 2.4, there is
good reason to suspect that it does: the policy pursued by an independent central bank with
a well-deﬁned nominal anchor is less likely to be inﬂuenced by the governor’s preferences
than one lacking those two features.
One could make a number of distinctions along these lines, and in the ideal world it
would be interesting to distinguish between inﬂation targeters and non-targeters, for exam-
ple, or between those with money targets and those without. The relatively small number
of observations precludes such ﬁne-grained distinctions, unfortunately; instead, we make
a cruder distinction between “strong” and “weak” policy frameworks. Strong frameworks
satisfy two criteria: First, the central bank must enjoy at least partial autonomy, as deﬁned
in Kuttner & Posen (2001).29 And second, the framework must include an explicit nom-
inal anchor, such as an inﬂation target or an operational intermediate money target. The
United Kingdom, post-1997, and New Zealand, post-1989, are well-known examples of
the former; pre-European Monetary Union Germany and Switzerland are examples of the
latter. Central banks not satisfying both criteria are classiﬁed as having weak policy frame-
works.30 In Table 2, the column labeled “W/S” gives the framework in effect at the time of
the event (W for weak, S for strong).
Table 4 shows the results when the sample is partitioned along this dimension. As
hypothesized, there is strong evidence of a pronounced reaction for those with weak policy
frameworks: all three ﬁnancial variables display statistically signiﬁcant responses. For
exchange rates and bond yields, the sum-of-squares statistic rejects the null of no reaction
at the 1 percent level, or at the 5 percent level when the bootstrapped critical values are
29Speciﬁcally, to be classiﬁed as fully autonomous, a central bank must be under no obligation to ﬁnance
government spending, and the governor cannot be dismissed without cause. Banks meeting one of these two
conditions are classiﬁed as partially autonomous.
30Although the U.S. Federal Reserve published monetary aggregate targets throughout much of the 1970s
and 1980s, Friedman & Kuttner (1996) show that these targets had no measurable impact on the conduct of
monetary policy. Consequently, despite the Fed’s high level of independence, the United States is deﬁned as
having a weak framework.
25used. The proportion of events associated with a 1.96 standard deviation change is also
quite large: 0.22 for the exchange rate, 0.19 for the stock price, and 0.14 for bond yields.
Just as important, there is no evidence of a reaction for those central banks with a strong
policy framework. In these cases, neither statistic rejects the null hypothesis at even the
10 percent level. In fact, for bonds and stocks, no announcement generates a 1.96 standard
deviation change; for exchange rates, the proportion is a statistically insigniﬁcant 0.11.
One possible objection is that these results concerning the policy framework are heavily
inﬂuenced by U.S. appointments. All four Federal Reserve observations are associated
with a strong reaction in one or more of the markets and, because of its lack of a clear
nominal anchor, the Federal Reserve is classiﬁed as having a weak policy framework. The
appointments of Miller, Volcker, and Greenspan all generated exchange rate changes in
excess of two standard deviations. Greenspan’s appointment also led to a 27 basis point
(three standard deviation) increase in the bond yield, apparently on fears that he would be
too soft on inﬂation.31
To ensure that the results are not unduly inﬂuenced by U.S. data, we recalculated the
test statistics for those central banks classiﬁed as having a weak framework, excluding the
observations corresponding to the four Fed appointments. The results, shown in the last
row of Table 4, show that the U.S. experience is not anomalous. Even with these four
observations deleted, the null of no reaction is rejected, albeit at a diminished level of
statistical signiﬁcance due, at least in part, to the reduction in sample size.
4.5 Quantitative and economic interpretations
As in any such exercise, it is fair to ask whether the results are economically, as well
as statistically, signiﬁcant. One gauge of economic signiﬁcance is simply the share of
appointments associated with large reactions, which is substantial: over 20 percent exceed
1.96 standard deviations for the exchange rate in the cases of newsworthy appointments and
weak monetary policy frameworks. Translating these numbers into percentage changes is
31Meyer & Sack (2005) characterized the episode as an “inﬂation scare.”
26not straightforward, since we allow the standard deviation to vary across countries and over
time. For the United States, the standard deviation of daily exchange rate changes was 0.57
percent during the period just prior to Bernanke’s appointment, and this is representative
of most of the episodes in our sample. That means a two standard deviation change in
the exchange rate would be something on the order of 1.1 percent. The magnitudes are
similar in the case of bond yield and stock price movements. For bonds, the 4.5 basis point
standard deviation prior to Bernanke’s appointment is typical, so a two standard deviation
change would be 9 basis points.
Another way to assess the results’ quantitative signiﬁcance uses the sum-of-squares
statistic. Under the “no news” null hypothesis, the standard deviation of the normalized
event-day changes should be equal to unity. Thus, the event-day standard deviation, calcu-
lated directly from the sum-of-squares statistic, will give a sense of the increase in volatil-
ity associated with new governor announcements. Speciﬁcally, according to equation 7,
s2
z = 1+s2






Things are slightly more complicated if it is assumed that only some share a of the an-





Using the results in Tables 3 and 4, we ﬁnd that, in cases where there is a statistically
signiﬁcant reaction, the standard deviation of the h shock is on roughly the same order of
magnitude as that of the e shock. For the full sample in the case of the exchange rate, for
example, ˆ sh =0:73, assuming a =1. At the other end of the spectrum, ˆ sh =1:32 for bond
yields in the weak policy framework subsample, assuming a = 0:5. For the pre-Bernanke
period in the United States, these ﬁgures would imply h shocks in the neighborhood of
0.57 percent for the exchange rate and 4.5 basis points for bond yields.
27Having established that central bank appointments contain (or are at least perceived to
contain) statistically and economically signiﬁcant news, the remaining question is whether
the observed reactions tend to go systematically in one direction or the other. Speciﬁcally,
we would like to determine whether there is any evidence to support the “weak until proven
strong” hypothesis discussed above in section 2.4: if true, then the responses should be
consistent with a jump in expected inﬂation (a depreciation of the currency and higher
bond yields). Calculating the average reaction and the associated t test statistics should
reveal whether this is actually observed in the data.
Table 5 reports the average change in the (normalized) ﬁnancial variables, and t tests
for the null of a zero mean. The table includes the statistics for the full sample of events,
plus several subsets in which the null of no reaction was soundly rejected in Tables 3 and
4. The main ﬁnding here is a negative one. The table shows that announcements fail to
generate a consistent, statistically signiﬁcant change on average in either direction for any
of the ﬁnancial variables. Regardless of the sample chosen, the average change is neither
statistically nor economically signiﬁcant. The average change in the exchange rate for the
full sample, for example, is  0:110, an appreciation of 0.1 standard deviations. The aver-
age changes in the bond yield and the stock price are  0:14 and 0:01 standard deviations,
respectively. Restricting the sample to newsworthy events, or those central banks with
weak policy frameworks, makes no difference: every average change is statistically and
economically insigniﬁcant. Thus, there is no empirical support for the “weak until proven
strong” hypothesis.
Overall, the ﬁndings reported in Tables 3 and 4 show that ﬁnancial markets, especially
the foreign exchange and bond markets, do respond to news about the new central bank
governor. The reactions, however, are not unidirectional: in particular, the results reported
in Table 5 provide no support for the “weak until proven strong” hypothesis. That reac-
tions are observed in both directions suggests they are based on perceived characteristics of
speciﬁc appointees, rather than a generic concern that all new governors are susceptible to
inﬂation bias. This is also consistent with the failure to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reaction to the un-
expected departure of an incumbent: ﬁnancial markets apparently render a snap judgment
28on the preferences of the new appointee but do not exhibit a generalized panic over news
of a change in governor.
5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the question of whether the appointment of a new central bank
governor, or the departure of the incumbent, affects ﬁnancial markets—and if so, why. To
address this question, we assembled a unique dataset consisting of the announcement dates
of appointments and unscheduled departures and merged it with high-frequency data on
exchange rates, bond yields, and stock prices.
In general, the results show that markets do seem to care who chairs the central bank.
Our primary ﬁnding is that ﬁnancial markets tend to react to the appointment of a new
central bank governor with larger-than-normal price changes, especially when a distinction
is made between “newsworthy” announcements (i.e., those plausibly incorporating new in-
formation) and those merely conﬁrming an anticipated appointment. Given the limitations
of our dataset, however, it is hard to determine whether the observed market reactions result
from differences in the governors’ perceived inﬂation objectives or their relative weight on
output and inﬂation.
Second, the reaction of asset prices tends to be considerably stronger for central banks
with weak monetary policy frameworks compared with those with strong frameworks, de-
ﬁned as some degree of independence plus an operational domestic nominal anchor. This
conﬁrms that strong policy frameworks effectively stabilize inﬂation expectations, thus cor-
roborating the analysis of G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005a) and Levin et al. (2004) for inﬂation-
targeting central banks. It would, of course, be interesting to further partition the sample
on other criteria, such as the size and structure of the policymaking committee. The rela-
tively small number of observations in our sample precludes a more ﬁne-grained analysis,
however.
Third, we ﬁnd no systematic tendency for bond yields to rise, or the exchange rate to
depreciate, in response to the announcement of a new governor; nor is there a signiﬁcant
29negative response to the unscheduled departure of the incumbent. These ﬁndings contra-
dict the “weak until proven strong” view sometimes expressed in the academic literature
and in the business press. The lack of support for this hypothesis suggests that ﬁnancial
market participants tend to sift through the available information on the new governor in
an effort to form an unprejudiced (but not necessarily correct ex post) inference regarding
the appointee’s likely policy preferences. This conclusion supports and generalizes that of
Meyer & Sack (2005), who infer, based on their case study of the Greenspan appointment,
that the Fed’s credibility is largely tied to the credentials of the Fed chairman.
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the probability of rejection, as a function of the share of high-variance
(“news”) observations, for three test statistics: the c2 statistic based on the sum of squared normal-
ized changes in the ﬁnancial variable; the share of observations in the 5% tail; and the mean of the
absolute values of the change in the ﬁnancial variable. The “news” variance is twice the “normal”
variance, the sample size is 60, and 10,000 trials were used in the calculation.
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the probability of rejection from the c2 test, as a function of the share of
high-variance observations, for a variety of sample sizes. The “news” variance is twice the “normal”
variance, and 10,000 trials were used in the calculation.
34Table 1
Central bank governors’ inﬂation performance
Linear model Nonlinear model
Regressor (a) (b) (c) (d)
1977 inﬂation (p77) 8:96 10:34 ::: :::
(Year – 1977) (b1)  0:28  0:64 ::: :::
(Year – 1977)2 (b2) ::: 0:013 ::: :::
Terminal inﬂation (p0) ::: ::: 2† 1:16
Decay rate (d) ::: ::: 0:16 0:13
Australia dummy  0:59  0:19 9:8 13:4
Canada dummy  0:79  0:49 11:5 12:5
Finland dummy  0:25 0:36 18:7 16:7
France dummy  1:33  1:10 8:5 9:3
Germany dummy  3:02  2:66 2:1 3:3
Italy dummy 2:04 2:09 12:4 13:4
Japan dummy  2:51  2:42  17:3  3:3
New Zealand dummy  0:12  0:24 5:8 13:3
Norway dummy  0:44  0:38 5:4 14:9
Portugal dummy 1:68 2:62 51:9 36:6
Spain dummy  0:17 0:75 24:1 19:9
Sweden dummy  0:88 0:77 20:5 17:0
Switzerland dummy  3:01  2:85 1:3 2:6
UK dummy 0:11 0:24 16:3 15:1
US dummy ::: ::: 11:0 11:3
¯ R2 0:551 0:623 0:774 0:784
Standard error 2:22 2:03 1:58 1:54
Note: The table reports the results from regressions of central bank governors’ average inﬂation
rates as a function of a time trend and country-speciﬁc dummy variables. The inﬂation rate is at an
annual rate, and expressed in percentage terms. The sample consists of 45 of the 49 central bank
governors’ tenures whose length exceeded 12 months. Estimation is by ordinary least squares for
the linear model, nonlinear least squares for the nonlinear mode. Parentheses indicate statistical
signiﬁcance: *** for the 0.01 level, ** for 0.05, and * for 0.10. A y indicates that the value of the
parameter is imposed, not estimated.
35Table 2
Announcements of governor departures and appointments
Exchange rate Bond yield Stock price
Event Date ID? W/S % D t bp D t % D t
Australia
Fraser 7/5/1989 Y W -0.53 -0.76 15 1.99 0.58 0.70
MacFarlane 8/14/1996 Y S 0.03 -0.01 5 1.00 -0.35 -0.53
Stevens 8/1/2006 Y S 0.42 0.79 1 -0.01 -0.06 0.00
Canada
Crow 12/17/1986 N W -0.02 -0.16 -4 -0.63 -0.07 -0.15
Thiessen 12/22/1993 N S -0.60 -1.82 -10 -1.61 0.29 0.50
Dodge 12/20/2000 N S -0.03 -0.20 -5 -1.43 -2.78 -1.54
Finland
Koivisto departure 6/14/1979 W 0.01 0.14
Karjalainen 2/5/1982 Y W -0.56 -2.27
Karjalainen departure 5/13/1983 W 0.16 0.37
Kullberg 5/27/1983 Y W -0.38 -0.75
Hamalainen 4/3/1992 N W -2.55 -13.01 -19 -1.53
France
Clappier 6/12/1974 N W -0.81 -1.59
De la Geniere 11/14/1979 N W 0.28 0.77
Camdessus 11/14/1984 N W 0.00 -0.05
Camdessus departure 12/17/1986 W 0.03 0.15
De Larosiere 1/16/1987 Y W 0.19 1.82 1 0.18
De Larosiere departure 8/17/1993 S -0.77 -2.50 6 1.47 -0.55 -0.68
Trichet 9/13/1993 Y S -0.73 -2.38 -3 -0.38 0.51 0.49
Germany
Emminger 3/9/1977 N S 0.17 0.54
Poehl 9/19/1979 Y S -0.33 -0.90
Poehl departure 5/16/1991 S 0.41 0.30 -4 -0.71 0.48 0.23
Schlesinger 5/29/1991 Y S 0.91 0.85 -3 -0.51 -0.04 -0.12
Tietmeyer 6/23/1993 Y S -0.21 -0.35 2 0.58 0.08 0.07
Italy
Bafﬁ 7/30/1975 N W -0.61 -1.57
Ciampi 9/21/1979 N W 0.46 2.05
Ciampi departure 4/26/1993 W -1.22 -1.87 -3 -0.27
Fazio 5/4/1993 N W -0.12 -0.24 -3 -0.27
Japan
Mieno 11/22/1989 Y W 0.07 0.06 -1 -0.25 0.63 1.13
Matsushita 11/10/1994 Y W 0.14 0.29 0 -0.12 -0.82 -1.15
Matsushita departure 3/12/1998 W -0.04 -0.07 2 0.60 -1.09 -0.53
Hayami 3/16/1998 N W 0.91 1.13 -4 -1.16 -1.17 -0.55
Fukui 2/24/2003 N W -0.85 -1.41 -2 -0.97 0.60 0.52
Continued:::
36Table 2, continued
Exchange rate Bond yield Stock price
Event Date ID? W/S % D t bp D t % D t
New Zealand
Brash 6/14/1988 N W 0.53 0.91 -0.68 -0.43
Brash departure 4/26/2002 S 0.20 0.42 -8 -1.39 0.13 0.21
Bollard 8/22/2002 N S 0.22 0.44 3 0.52 0.87 1.60
Norway
Moland departure 11/17/1995 W 0.09 0.36
Storvik 2/23/1996 Y W -0.05 -0.17 -19 -4.15
Gjedrem 10/2/1998 N W 1.74 2.46 -1 -0.10 -1.58 -0.74
Portugal
Constancio departure 3/24/1986 W -0.69 -1.50
Moreira 5/16/1986 N W 0.28 0.43
Beleza 4/9/1992 Y W -0.26 -1.04
De Sousa 6/23/1994 N W -0.15 -0.66 -14 -1.38 3.09 2.58
Spain
Rubio 7/20/1984 Y W -0.59 -1.01
Luis Rojo 6/29/1992 N W 0.45 1.96 8 1.26 -1.73 -2.53
Sweden
Dennis 10/1/1982 N W 0.10 0.34
Baeckstroem 11/3/1993 N S 0.00 -0.12 -13 -1.62
Heikensten 6/13/2002 Y S -0.19 -1.30 -7 -1.78 0.02 -0.01
Heikensten departure 9/29/2005 S -0.53 -2.02 3 0.77 0.00 -0.30
Ingves 10/11/2005 N S -0.02 -0.19 2 0.50 0.16 0.22
Switzerland
Leutwiler 3/15/1974 Y S 0.15 0.43
Leutwiler departure 6/13/1984 S 0.01 -0.08
Languetin 10/31/1984 Y S -0.04 -0.24
Lusser 9/10/1987 Y S 0.08 0.36
Meyer 10/26/1995 N S -0.31 -1.10 0.03 0.10
Roth 9/18/2000 N S -0.21 -0.69 4 1.29 -0.98 -1.58
United Kingdom
Leigh-Pemberton 12/23/1982 N W 1.15 2.30 -1 0.04
George 1/22/1993 N W 0.64 0.49 3 0.42 0.28 0.13
King 11/27/2002 Y S -0.36 -0.87 0 -0.03 0.99 0.44
United States
Miller 12/28/1977 N W 1.17 2.59 1 0.25 0.06 -0.05
Volcker 7/25/1979 N W -0.80 -2.51 -2 -0.44 0.02 0.01
Greenspan 6/2/1987 N W 1.65 2.35 27 3.19 -0.47 -0.46
Bernanke 10/24/2005 N W 0.33 0.56 6 1.28 1.66 2.81
Note: The table lists the events (announcements of new governors plus unscheduled departures) used in the
analysis. For new appointments, the column labeled “ID?” indicates whether the identity of the appointee was
anticipated in advance of the announcement. Weak and strong monetary policy frameworks are distinguished
in the column labeled “W/S.” For the exchange rate, positive numbers correspond to depreciations.
37Table 3
Tests for the presence of market reactions, distinguished by type of event
Exchange rate Bond yield Stock price
N (k) N (k) N (k)
Sample c2 stat 5% tail c2 stat 5% tail c2 stat 5% tail




 0:08 35:0 0:09




 0:09 34:1 0:11
Unscheduled exits 12 (2) 6 (0) 5 (0)
16:7 0:17 5:6 0:00 0:9 0:00
Newsworthy events 41 (9) 26 (1) 23 (3)
71:3
 0:22
 35:8 0:04 31:2 0:13







Non-newsworthy 20 (2) 12 (2) 10 (0)
events 22:6 0:10 26:2
 0:17 3:8 0:00
Note: The table reports tests for the joint signiﬁcance of the reactions of the exchange
rate, bond yield, and stock price. N is the number of observations, and k is the number of
observations for which the normalized change exceeds 1.96 standard deviations. The c2
test statistic is the sum of the squared normalized change in the ﬁnancial market variable.
Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. Super-
scripted asterisks are based on the critical values from the c2 and binomial distributions.
Subscripted asterisks are based on bootstrapped critical values.
38Table 4
Tests for the presence of market reactions, distinguished by policy framework
Exchange rate Bond yield Stock price
N (k) N (k) N (k)
Sample c2 stat 5% tail c2 stat 5% tail c2 stat 5% tail




 0:08 35:0 0:09








Strong policy 24 (3) 17 (0) 17 (0)
frameworks 29:6 0:13 19:5 0:00 10:0 0:00




 0:12 17:8 0:17
Note: The table reports tests for the joint signiﬁcance of the reactions of the exchange
rate, bond yield, and stock price. N is the number of observations, and k is the number of
observations for which the normalized change exceeds 1.96 standard deviations. The c2
test statistic is the sum of the squared normalized change in the ﬁnancial market variable.
Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. Super-
scripted asterisks are based on the critical values from the c2 and binomial distributions.
Subscripted asterisks are based on bootstrapped critical values.
39Table 5
Average market reaction to governor announcements
Exchange Bond Stock
Sample rate yield price
Full sample Avg. change  0:110  0:142 0:011
N 61 38 33
p-value 0:492 0:500 0:951
New governor Avg. change  0:009  0:184 0:051
announcements N 49 32 28
p-value 0:962 0:443 0:810
Newsworthy events Avg. change 0:018  0:074  0:028
N 41 26 23
p-value 0:933 0:753 0:912
Newsworthy events, Avg. change 0:242  0:120 0:024
appointments only N 29 20 18
p-value 0:351 0:674 0:940
Weak policy Avg. change 0:105  0:098 0:080
frameworks N 37 21 16
p-value 0:640 0:760 0:811
Note: The table reports the average change in the normalized exchange rate, bond yield,
and stock price on event days. The changes are expressed in terms of standard deviations
of the relevant variable. Exchange rates are bilateral with respect to the United States; for
the United States, it is the bilateral exchange rate with respect to the Deutsche mark (euro,
post 1999). The change is deﬁned so that positive numbers correspond to depreciations.
The reported p-values are for the null hypothesis that the mean change is zero.
40Appendix: Data sources
The table below summarizes the sources and availability of daily bond yield and stock price
data. Unless otherwise noted, the yield is that of a 10-year government bond. FRBNY data
were compiled by the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(FRBNY), and Haver refers to Haver Analytics (www.haver.com). All daily exchange rate
data were obtained from the Federal Reserve’s H.10 release. The inﬂation series used in
section 2.2 were calculated from consumer price index data obtained from the International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Country Bond yield Stock price
Australia RBA Occasional Paper No. 10, All Ordinaries, Haver, 1/1985-
1/1989-9/1993 & update, 10/1993-
Canada FRBNY, 6/1985- Toronto 300 Composite, 1/1984-
Finland Bank of Finland, 8/1991- OMX Helsinki, Haver, 1/1995-
France FRBNY, 1/1987- CAC40, Haver, 1/1988-
Germany FRBNY, 1/1983- DAX30, www.econstats.com, 1/1981-
Italy FRBNY, 1/1989- MIB30, Haver, 1/1996-
Japan FRBNY, 2/1982- Nikkei 225, Haver, 1/1984-
New Zealand 10-year swap rate, RBNZ, 12/1997- Barclay’s Capital Price Index, 1988;
NZSE Top 50, 2002; RBNZ.
Norway Norges Bank, 1/1996- Oslo OBX, Haver, 4/1996-
Portugal Bank of Portugal, 7/1993- PSI20, Haver, 1/1993-
Spain Bank of Spain, 4/1991- Madrid General Index, Haver, 1/1990-
Sweden Riksbank (Reuters), 2/1987- Stockholm Affarsvarlden, Haver, 1/1996-
Switzerland Swiss National Bank, 1/1998- Zurich Swiss Market, Haver, 7/1998-
United Kingdom Bank of England, 1/1979- FTSE100, Haver, 1/1984-
United States Federal Reserve H.15, 1/1974- S&P500, Haver, 1/1974-
41